GUI framework



reinventing the internet

Bernd Paysan

#wefixthenet, YBTI session, 32c3, Hamburg

Level 7: Applications 0 000



GUI framework



Motivation

Level 7: Applications Basic Frameworks Try it

GUI framework

Apps in a Sandbox API Basics

GUI framework

2.5 years after Snowden



What happend to change the world:

 Politics Manhatten project to find "the golden key"?
 Users don't want their dick picks be watched and use DuckDuckGo and encrypted chat
 Software NSA backdoors have been refitted by attackers (Juniper)

Solutions net2o starts to be usable (somewhat)

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net2o in a nutshell



- Path switched packets with 2ⁿ size writing into shared memory buffers
- Ephemeral key exchange and signatures with Ed25519, symmetric authenticated encryption+hash+prng with Keccak, symmetric block encryption with Threefish onion routing camouflage probably with AES
- 4. Timing driven delay minimizing flow control
- 5. Stack-oriented tokenized command language
- 6. Distributed data (files) and distributed metadata (prefix hash trie)
- 7. Apps in a sandboxed environment for displaying content

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Level 7: Applications 0 000



Objectives



- lightweight, fast, scalable
- easy to implement
- secure
- media capable
- works as overlay on current networks (UDP/IP), but can replace the entire stack







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Basic Frameworks





PKI Create, import, and exchange keys

Named file copy For testing only

Vault A container for encrypted data without metadata exposure

DHT Query key/value pairs (keys are pubkeys or hash keys)

Chat Instant messaging 1:1 or in chat groups

Version control system For larger content (not yet implemented)

Sync to synchronize your computers (RSN) Audio/Video Chat Real time data streaming (RSN)

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
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
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Try it — Generate a Key

Linux you run: ./n20 cmd keygen <nick> Enter your passphrase twice.

Android Tap on the little nettie to start the app, it will autodetect that you don't have a key generated. Enter nick and passphrase twice.

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Level 7: Applications $\stackrel{\circ}{\circ}_{\circ\circ\bullet}$

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- To get my key, search for it (32 bit is sufficient) keysearch kQusJ
- Try to chat with me chat 32c3@bernd
- Aquire more keys by observing a group chat. List your keys with
 - n2o keylist
 - from within the chat.
- Change networks with your Android and watch that the chat still works.

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- Therefore, the application logic is usually on the server side
- This doesn't work for a P2P network!
- Content is structured text, images, videos, music, etc.

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- There's a phenomenon I call "Turing creep": Every sufficiently complex system contains a user-accessible Turing-complete language
- Corollary: Every efficient sufficiently complex system can execute native machine code
- The application logic is to present the data; data itself is as above: structured text, images, videos, music, etc.
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There are several options tried; as usual, things are broken:

- Execute code in a controlled secure VM, see for example Java. This is broken by design, as securing something from the inside doesn't work.
- 2. Execute code in a sandbox. This has shown as more robust, depending on how complex the outside of the sandbox is.
- 3. Public inspection of code. This is how the open source world works, but the underhanded C contest shows that inspection is tricky.
- 4. Scan for known evil code. This is the security industry's approach, and it is not working.
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
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Formats&Requirements

How to display things



Level 7: Applications 0 000

Why OpenGL?

OpenGL can do everything





OpenGL renders:

- 1. Triangles, lines, points simple components
- 2. Textures and gradients
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currently used glue: HTML+CSS+JavaScript

- containers with Flash, Java, ActiveX, PDF, Google's NaCl...
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- browser: run-time and development tool for applications



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For Further Reading I



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